Environment: VC6 SP4, Win 2000 SP2
Key Words: Code Injection, Windows Hooks, Remote Threads
Contents
- Introduction
- Windows Hooks
- The CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary Technique
- The CreateRemoteThread & WriteProcessMemory Technique
- Some Final Words
- Appendixes
- References
- Downloads
- Article History
- Comments
Several password spy tutorials have been posted to CodeGuru, but all of them rely on Windows hooks. Is there any other way to make such a utility? Yes, there is. But first, let me review the problem briefly, just to make sure we’re all on the same page.
To “read” the contents of any control—either belonging to your application or not—you generally send the WM_GETTEXT
message to it. This also applies to edit controls, except in one special case. If the edit control belongs to another process and the ES_PASSWORD
style is set, this approach fails. Only the process that “owns” the password control can get its contents via WM_GETTEXT
. So, our problem reduces to the following: How to get
::SendMessage( hPwdEdit, WM_GETTEXT, nMaxChars, psBuffer );
executed in the address space of another process.
In general, there are three possibilities to solve this problem:
- Put your code into a DLL; then, map the DLL to the remote process via windows hooks.
- Put your code into a DLL and map the DLL to the remote process using the CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary technique.
- Instead of writing a separate DLL, copy your code to the remote process directly—via
WriteProcessMemory
—and start its execution withCreateRemoteThread
. A detailed description of this technique can be found here.
Demo applications: HookSpy and HookInjEx
The primary role of Windows hooks is to monitor the message traffic of some thread. In general, there are:
- Local hooks, where you monitor the message traffic of any thread belonging to your process.
- Remote hooks, which can be:
- thread-specific, to monitor the message traffic of a thread belonging to another process;
- system-wide, to monitor the message traffic for all threads currently running on the system.
If the hooked thread belongs to another process (cases 2a & 2b), your hook procedure must reside in a dynamic-link library (DLL). The system then maps the DLL containing the hook procedure into the address space of the hooked thread. Windows will map the entire DLL, not just the hook procedure. That is why Windows hooks can be used to inject code into another process’s address space.
While I won’t discuss hooks in this article further (take a look at the SetWindowHookEx
API in MSDN for more details), let me give you two more hints that you won’t find in the documentation, but might still be useful:
- After a successful call to
SetWindowsHookEx
, the system maps the DLL into the address space of the hooked thread automatically, but not necessary immediately. Because Windows hooks are all about messages, the DLL isn’t really mapped until an adequate event happens. For example:If you install a hook that monitors all nonqueued messages of some thread ( WH_CALLWNDPROC
), the DLL won’t be mapped into the remote process until a message is actually sent to (some window of) the hooked thread. In other words, ifUnhookWindowsHook
is called before a message was sent to the hooked thread, the DLL will never be mapped into the remote process (although the call toSetWindowsHookEx
itself succeeded). To force an immediate mapping, send an appropriate event to the concerned thread right after the call toSetWindowsHookEx
.The same is true for unmapping the DLL after calling
UnhookWindowsHook
. The DLL isn’t really unmapped until an adequate event happens. - When you install hooks, they can affect the overall system performance (especially system-wide hooks). However, you can easily overcome this shortcoming if you use thread-specific hooks solely as a DLL mapping mechanism, and not to trap messages. Consider the following code snippet:
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HANDLE hModule,
DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
LPVOID lpReserved )
{
if( ul_reason_for_call == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH )
{
// Increase reference count via LoadLibrary
char lib_name[MAX_PATH];
::GetModuleFileName( hDll, lib_name, MAX_PATH );
::LoadLibrary( lib_name );// Safely remove hook
::UnhookWindowsHookEx( g_hHook );
}
return TRUE;
}
So, what happens?
First, we map the DLL to the remote process via Windows hooks. Then, right after the DLL has actually been mapped, we unhook it. Normally, the DLL would be unmapped now, too, as soon as the first message to the hooked thread would arrive. The dodgy thing is we prevent this unmapping by increasing the DLLs reference count viaLoadLibrary
.The question that remains is: How to unload the DLL now, once we are finished?
UnhookWindowsHookEx
won’t do it because we unhooked the thread already. You could do it this way:- Install another hook, just before you want to unmap the DLL;
- Send a “special” message to the remote thread;
- Catch this message in your hook procedure; in response, call
FreeLibrary & UnhookWindowsHookEx
.
Now, hooks are used only while mapping/unmapping the DLL to/from the remote process; there is no influence on the performance of the “hooked” thread in the meantime. Put another way: We get a DLL mapping mechanism that doesn’t interfere the target process more than the
LoadLibrary
technique discussed below does (see Section II.). However, opposed to theLoadLibrary
technique, this solution works on both WinNT and Win9x.But, when should one use this trick?
Always when the DLL has to be present in the remote process for a longer period of time (i.e. if you subclass a control belonging to another process) and you want to interfere the target process as little as possible. I didn’t use it in HookSpy because the DLL there is injected just for a moment—just long enough to get the password. I rather provided another example—HookInjEx—to demonstrate it. HookInjEx maps/unmaps a DLL into “explorer.exe”, where it subclasses the Start button. More precisely: It swaps the left and right mouse clicks for the Start button.
You will find HookSpy and HookInjEx as well as their sources in the download package at the end of the article.
II. The CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary Technique
Demo application: LibSpy
In general, any process can load a DLL dynamically by using the LoadLibrary
API. But, how do we force an external process to call this function? The answer is CreateRemoteThread
.
Let’s take a look at the declaration of the LoadLibrary
and FreeLibrary
APIs first:
HINSTANCE LoadLibrary(
LPCTSTR lpLibFileName // address of filename of library module
);BOOL FreeLibrary(
HMODULE hLibModule // handle to loaded library module
);
Now, compare them with the declaration of ThreadProc
—the thread routine—passed to CreateRemoteThread
:
DWORD WINAPI ThreadProc(
LPVOID lpParameter // thread data
);
As you can see, all functions use the same calling convention and all accept a 32-bit parameter. Also, the size of the returned value is the same. In other words: We may pass a pointer to LoadLibrary/FreeLibrary
as the thread routine to CreateRemoteThread
.
However, there are two problems (see the description for CreateRemoteThread
below):
- The
lpStartAddress
parameter inCreateRemoteThread
must represent the starting address of the thread routine in the remote process. - If
lpParameter
—the parameter passed toThreadFunc
—is interpreted as an ordinary 32-bit value (FreeLibrary
interprets it as anHMODULE
), everything is fine. However, iflpParameter
is interpreted as a pointer (LoadLibraryA
interprets it as a pointer to achar
string), it must point to some data in the remote process.
The first problem is actually solved by itself. Both LoadLibrary
and FreeLibray
are functions residing in kernel32.dll. Because kernel32.dll is guaranteed to be present and at the same load address in every “normal” process (see Appendix A), the address of LoadLibrary/FreeLibray
is the same in every process too. This ensures that a valid pointer is passed to the remote process.
The second problem is also easy to solve: Simply copy the DLL module name (needed by LoadLibrary
) to the remote process via WriteProcessMemory
.
So, to use the CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary technique, follow these steps:
- Retrieve a
HANDLE
to the remote process (OpenProcess
). - Allocate memory for the DLL name in the remote process (
VirtualAllocEx
). - Write the DLL name, including full path, to the allocated memory (
WriteProcessMemory
). - Map your DLL into the remote process via
CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary
. - Wait until the remote thread terminates (
WaitForSingleObject
); this is until the call toLoadLibrary
returns. Put another way, the thread will terminate as soon as ourDllMain
(called with reasonDLL_PROCESS_ATTACH
) returns. - Retrieve the exit code of the remote thread (
GetExitCodeThread
). Note that this is the value returned byLoadLibrary
, thus the base address (HMODULE
) of our mapped DLL. - Free the memory allocated in Step #2 (
VirtualFreeEx
). - Unload the DLL from the remote process via
CreateRemoteThread & FreeLibrary
. Pass theHMODULE
handle retreived in Step #6 toFreeLibrary
(vialpParameter
inCreateRemoteThread
).
Note: If your injected DLL spawns any new threads, be sure they are all terminated before unloading it. - Wait until the thread terminates (
WaitForSingleObject
).
Also, don’t forget to close all the handles once you are finished: To both threads, created in Steps #4 and #8; and the handle to the remote process, retrieved in Step #1.
Let’s examine some parts of LibSpy’s sources now, to see how the above steps are implemented in reality. For the sake of simplicity, error handling and unicode support are removed.
HANDLE hThread;
char szLibPath[_MAX_PATH]; // The name of our “LibSpy.dll”
// module (including full path!);
void* pLibRemote; // The address (in the remote process)
// where szLibPath will be copied to;
DWORD hLibModule; // Base address of loaded module (==HMODULE);// initialize szLibPath
//…// 1. Allocate memory in the remote process for szLibPath
// 2. Write szLibPath to the allocated memory
pLibRemote = ::VirtualAllocEx( hProcess, NULL, sizeof(szLibPath),
MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE );
::WriteProcessMemory( hProcess, pLibRemote, (void*)szLibPath,
sizeof(szLibPath),NULL );// Load “LibSpy.dll” into the remote process
// (via CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary)
hThread = ::CreateRemoteThread( hProcess, NULL, 0,
(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE )::GetProcAddress(
::GetModuleHandle(“Kernel32”), “LoadLibraryA”),
pLibRemote, 0, NULL );
::WaitForSingleObject( hThread, INFINITE );// Get handle of the loaded module
::GetExitCodeThread( hThread, &hLibModule );// Clean up
::CloseHandle( hThread );
::VirtualFreeEx( hProcess, pLibRemote,
sizeof(szLibPath),MEM_RELEASE );
Assume our SendMessage
—the code that we actually wanted to inject—was placed in DllMain
(DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH
), so it has already been executed by now. Then, it is time to unload the DLL from the target process:
// Unload “LibSpy.dll” from the target process
// (via CreateRemoteThread & FreeLibrary)
hThread = ::CreateRemoteThread( hProcess, NULL, 0,
(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE )::GetProcAddress(
::GetModuleHandle(“Kernel32”), “FreeLibrary”),
(void*)hLibModule,
0, NULL );
::WaitForSingleObject( hThread, INFINITE );// Clean up
::CloseHandle( hThread );
Interprocess Communications
Until now, we only talked about how to inject the DLL into the remote process. However, in most situations the injected DLL will need to communicate with your original application in some way (recall that the DLL is mapped into some remote process now, not to our local application!). Take our Password Spy: The DLL has to know the handle to the control that actually contains the password. Obviously, this value can’t be hard-coded into it at compile time. Similarly, once the DLL gets the password, it has to send it back to our application so we can display it appropriately.
Fortunately, there are many ways to deal with this situation: File Mapping, WM_COPYDATA
, the Clipboard, and the sometimes very handy #pragma data_seg
, to name just a few. I won’t describe these techniques here because they are all well documented either in MSDN (see Interprocess Communications) or in other tutorials. Anyway, I used solely the #pragma data_seg
in the LibSpy example.
You will find LibSpy and its sources in the download package at the end of the article.
III. The CreateRemoteThread & WriteProcessMemory Technique
Demo application: WinSpy
Another way to copy some code to another process’s address space and then execute it in the context of this process involves the use of remote threads and the WriteProcessMemory
API. Instead of writing a separate DLL, you copy the code to the remote process directly now—via WriteProcessMemory
—and start its execution with CreateRemoteThread
.
Again, WinSpy and InjectEx, as well as their sources, can be found in the download package at the end of the article.
At the end, let’s summarize some facts we didn’t mention so far:
OS | Processes | |
I. Hooks | Win9x and WinNT | only processes that link with USER32.DLL 1* |
II. CreateRemoteThread & LoadLibrary | WinNT only 2* | all processes 3*, including system services 4* |
III. CreateRemoteThread & WriteProcessMemory | WinNT only | all processes, including system services |
- Obviously you can’t hook a thread that has no message queue. Also,
SetWindowsHookEx
won’t work with system services, even if they link against USER32.DLL. - There is no
CreateRemoteThread
norVirtualAllocEx
on Win9x. (Actually, they can be emulated on Win9x, too; but that’s a story for yet another day.) - All processes = All Win32 processes + csrss.exe
Native applications (smss.exe, os2ss.exe, autochk.exe, etc) don’t use Win32 APIs, and thus don’t link against kernel32.dll either. The only exception is csrss.exe, the Win32 subsystem itself. It’s a native application but some of its libraries (~winsrv.dll) require Win32 DLLs, including kernel32.dll. - If you want to inject code into system services (lsass.exe, services.exe, winlogon.exe, and so on) or into csrss.exe, set the privileges of your process to “SeDebugPrivilege” (
AdjustTokenPrivileges
) before opening a handle to the remote process (OpenProcess
).
That’s almost it. There is just one more thing that you should bear in mind: Your injected code can, especially if something is wrong with it, easily pull the target process down to oblivion with it. Just remember: Power comes with responsibility!
Because many examples in this article were about passwords, you might find it interesting to read the article Super Password Spy++, written by Zhefu Zhang, too. There he explains how to get the passwords out of an Internet Explorer password field. More. He even shows you how to protect your password controls against such attacks.
Last note: The only reward someone gets for writing and publishing an article is the feedback he gets; so, if you found it useful, simply drop in a comment. But even more importantly: Let me know if something is wrong or buggy, if you think something could be done better, or that something is still left unclear.
Acknowledgments
First, thanks to all my readers here at CodeGuru. It is mainly because of your questions, that the article grew from its initial 1200 words to what it is today: An 6000 word “animal.” However, if there is someone that especially deserves to be singled out, then it is Rado Picha. Parts of the article greatly benefited from his suggestions and explanations to me. Last, but not least, thanks to Susan Moore for helping me through that minefield called the English language, and making my article more readable.
In general, an executable is composed of several sections, including a “.reloc” section.
When the linker creates an EXE or DLL file, it makes an assumption about where the file will be mapped into memory. That’s the so-called assumed/preferred load/base address. All the absolute addresses in the image are based on this linker assumed load address. If for whatever reason the image isn’t loaded at this address, the PE—portable executable—loader has to fix all the absolute addresses in the image. That is where the “.reloc” section comes in: It contains a list of all the places in the image, where the difference between the linker assumed load address and the actual load address needs to be factored in (anyway, note that most of the instructions produced by the compiler use some kind of relative addressing; as a result, there are not as many relocations as you might think). If, on the other side, the loader is able to load the image at the linkers preferred base address, the “.reloc” section is completely ignored.
But, how do kernel32.dll, user32.dll and their load addresses fit into the story?
Because every Win32 application needs kernel32.dll, and most of them need user32.dll, too, you can improve the load time of all executables by always mapping them (kernel32 and user32) to their preferred bases. Then the loader must never fix any (absolute) addresses in kernel32.dll and user32.dll.
Let’s close out this discussion with the following example:
Set the image base of some App.exe to KERNEL32’s (/base:”0x77e80000″ ) or to USER32’s (/base:”0x77e10000″ ) preferred base. If App.exe doesn’t import from USER32, just LoadLibrary it. Then compile App.exe and try to run it. An error box pops up (“Illegal System DLL Relocation”) and App.exe fails to load.
|
Why? When creating a process, the loader on Win 2000, Win XP and Win 2003 checks if kernel32.dll and user32.dll (their names are hardcoded into the loader) are mapped at their preferred bases; if not, a hard error is raised. In WinNT 4 ole32.dll was also checked. In WinNT 3.51 and lower such checks were not present, so kernel32.dll and user32.dll could be anywhere. Anyway, the only module that is always at its base is ntdll.dll. The loader doesn’t check it, but if ntdll.dll is not at its base, the process just can’t be created.
To summarize, on WinNT 4 and higher:
- DLLs, that are always mapped to their bases: kernel32.dll, user32.dll and ntdll.dll.
- DLLs that are present in every Win32 application (+ csrss.exe): kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll.
- The only DLL that is present in every process, even in native applications: ntdll.dll.
const int cbCodeSize = ((LPBYTE) AfterThreadFunc
– (LPBYTE) ThreadFunc);
you will actually calculate the “distance” between the JMP
s that point to ThreadFunc
and AfterThreadFunc
respectively (usually they will appear one right after the other; but don’t count on this). Now suppose our ThreadFunc
is at address 004014C0
and the accompanying JMP
instruction at 00401020
.
:00401020 jmp 004014C0
…
:004014C0 push EBP ; real address of ThreadFunc
:004014C1 mov EBP, ESP
…
Then
WriteProcessMemory( .., &ThreadFunc, cbCodeSize, ..);
will copy the “JMP 004014C0”
instruction (and all instructions in the range of cbCodeSize
that follow it) to the remote process—not the real ThreadFunc
. The first thing the remote thread will execute will be a “JMP 004014C0”
. Well, it will also be among its last instructions—not only to the remote thread, but to the whole process.
However, there is an exception to this JMP
instruction “rule.” If a function is declared as static
, it will be called directly, even if linked incrementally. That’s why Rule #4 says to declare ThreadFunc
and AfterThreadFunc
as static
or disable incremental linking. (Some other aspects of incremental linking can be found in the article “Remove Fatty Deposits from Your Applications Using Our 32-bit Liposuction Tools” by Matt Pietrek.)
void Dummy(void) { BYTE var[256]; var[0] = 0; var[1] = 1; var[255] = 255; }
could, for instance, compile into something like this:
:00401000 push ebp :00401001 mov ebp, esp :00401003 sub esp, 00000100 ; change ESP as storage for ; local variables is needed :00401006 mov byte ptr [esp], 00 ; var[0] = 0; :0040100A mov byte ptr [esp+01], 01 ; var[1] = 1; :0040100F mov byte ptr [esp+FF], FF ; var[255] = 255; :00401017 mov esp, ebp ; restore stack pointer :00401019 pop ebp :0040101A ret
Note how the stack pointer (ESP) was changed in the above example? But what is different if a function needs more than 4 Kb for its local variables? Well, then the stack pointer isn’t changed directly. Rather, another function (a stack probe) is called, which in turn changes it appropriately. But it’s exactly this additional function call that makes our ThreadFunc
“corrupt,” because its remote copy would call something that’s not there.
Let’s see what the documentation says about stack probes and the /Gs compiler option:
“The /Gssize option is an advanced feature with which you can control stack probes. A stack probe is a sequence of code that the compiler inserts into every function call. When activated, a stack probe reaches benignly into memory by the amount of space required to store the associated function’s local variables.
If a function requires more than size stack space for local variables, its stack probe is activated. The default value of size is the size of one page (4 Kb for 80×86 processors). This value allows a carefully tuned interaction between an application for Win32 and the Windows NT virtual-memory manager to increase the amount of memory committed to the program stack at run time.” |
I’m sure one or another wondered about the above statement: “…a stack probe reaches benignly into memory…”. Those compiler options (their descriptions!) are sometimes really irritating, at least until you look under the hood and see what’s going on. If, for instance, a function needs 12 Kb storage for its local variables, the memory on the stack would be “allocated” (more precisely: committed) this way:
sub esp, 0x1000 ; “allocate” first 4 Kb
test [esp], eax ; touches memory in order to commit a
; new page (if not already committed)
sub esp, 0x1000 ; “allocate” second 4 Kb
test [esp], eax ; …
sub esp, 0x1000
test [esp], eax
Note how the stack pointer is changed in 4 Kb steps now and, more importantly, how the bottom of the stack is “touched” (via test
) after each step. This ensures the page containing the bottom of the stack is being committed, before “allocating” (committing) another page.
After reading ..
“Each new thread receives its own stack space, consisting of both committed and reserved memory. By default, each thread uses 1 Mb of reserved memory, and one page of committed memory. The system will commit one page block from the reserved stack memory as needed.” (see MSDN CreateThread > dwStackSize > “Thread Stack Size”).
|
… it should also be clear why the documentation about /Gs says that you get with stack probes a carefully tuned interaction between your application and the Windows NT virtual-memory manager.
Now back to our ThreadFunc
and 4 Kb limit:
Although you could prevent calls to the stack probe routine with /Gs, the documentation warns you about doing so. Further, the documentation says you can turn stack probes on or off by using the #pragma check_stack
directive. However, it seems this pragma
doesn’t affect stack probes at all (either the documentation is buggy, or I am missing some other facts?). Anyway, recall that the CreateRemoteThread & WriteProcessMemory technique should be used only when injecting small peaces of code, so your local variables should rarely *consume* more than a few bytes and thus not get even close to the 4 Kb limit.
switch( arg1 ) {
case 1: ret = 1; break;
case 2: ret = 2; break;
case 3: ret = 3; break;
case 4: ret = 0xA0B0; break;
}
return ret;
}
It would compile into something like this:
Address OpCode&Params Decoded instruction
————————————————–
; arg1 -> ECX
:00401000 8B4C2404 mov ecx, dword ptr [esp+04]
:00401004 33C0 xor eax, eax ; EAX = 0
:00401006 49 dec ecx ; ECX —
:00401007 83F903 cmp ecx, 00000003
:0040100A 771E ja 0040102A; JMP to one of the addresses in table ***
; note that ECX contains the offset
:0040100C FF248D2C104000 jmp dword ptr [4*ecx+0040102C]; case 1: eax = 1;
:00401013 B801000000 mov eax, 00000001
:00401018 C3 ret; case 2: eax = 2;
:00401019 B802000000 mov eax, 00000002
:0040101E C3 ret; case 3: eax = 3;
:0040101F B803000000 mov eax, 00000003
:00401024 C3 ret; case 4: eax = 0xA0B0;
:00401025 B8B0A00000 mov eax, 0000A0B0:0040102A C3 ret
:0040102B 90 nop; Address table ***
:0040102C 13104000 DWORD 00401013 ; jump to case 1
:00401030 19104000 DWORD 00401019 ; jump to case 2
:00401034 1F104000 DWORD 0040101F ; jump to case 3
:00401038 25104000 DWORD 00401025 ; jump to case 4
Note how the switch-case
was implemented?
Rather than examining every single case
statement separately, an address table is created. Then, we jump to the right case
by simply calculating the offset into the address table. If you think for a moment, this really is an improvement. Imagine you had a switch
with 50 case
statements. Without the above trick, you had to execute 50 CMP
and JMP
instructions to get to the last case
. With the address table, on the contrary, you can jump to any case
by a single table look-up. In terms of computer algorithms and time complexity: We replace an O(2n) algorithm by an O(5) one, where:
- O denotes the worst-case time complexity.
- We assume five instructions are neccessary to calculate the offset, do the table look-up, and finally jump to the appropriate address.
Now, one might think the above was possible only because the case
constants were carefully chosen to be consecutive (1,2,3,4). Fortunately, it turns out the same solution can be applied to most real-world examples, only the offset calculation becomes somewhat more complicated. But there are two exceptions, though:
- if there are three or fewer
case
statements or - if the
case
constants are completely unrelated to each other (i.e.“case 1”
,“case 13”
,“case 50”
, and“case 1000”
)
then the resulting code does it the long way by examining every single case
constant separately, with the CMP
and JMP
instructions. In other words, then the resulting code is essentially the same as if you had an ordinary if-else if
sequence.
Point of interest: If you ever wondered for what reason only a constant-expression can accompany a case
statement, then you know why by now. In order to create the address table, this value obviously has to be known at compile time.
Now back to the problem!
Notice the JMP
instruction at address 0040100C
? Let’s see what Intel’s documentation says about the hex opcode FF
:
Opcode Instruction Description FF /4 JMP r/m32 Jump near, absolute indirect, address given in r/m32
Oops, the debatable JMP
uses some kind of absolute addressing? In other words, one of its operands (0040102C
in our case) represents an absolute address. Need I say more? Now, the remote ThreadFunc
would blindly think the address table for its switch
is at 0040102C
, JMP
to a wrong place, and thus effectively crash the remote process.
- You referenced a string inside of
ThreadFunc
that doesn’t exist. - One or more instructions in
ThreadFunc
use absolute addressing (see Appendix E for an example). ThreadFunc
calls a function that doesn’t exist (the call could be added by the compiler/linker). When you will look atThreadFunc
in dissasembler in this case you will see something like this:
:004014C0 push EBP ; entry point of ThreadFunc
:004014C1 mov EBP, ESP
…
:004014C5 call 0041550 ; this will crash the
; remote process
…
:00401502 ret
If the debatable
CALL
was added by the compiler (because some “forbidden” switch, such as /GZ, was turned on), it will be located either somewhere at the beginning or near the end ofThreadFunc
.
In any case, you can’t be careful enough with the CreateRemoteThread & WriteProcessMemory technique. Especially watch for your compiler/linker options. They could easily add something to your ThreadFunc
.
- Load Your 32-bit DLL into Another Process’s Address Space Using INJLIB by Jeffrey Richter. MSJ May, 1994
- HOWTO: Subclass a Window in Windows 95; Microsoft Knowledge Base Article – 125680
- Tutorial 24: Windows Hooks by Iczelion
- CreateRemoteThread by Felix Kasza
- API hooking revealed by Ivo Ivanov
- Peering Inside the PE: A Tour of the Win32 Portable Executable File Format by Matt Pietrek, March 1994
- Intel Architecture Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 2: Instruction Set Reference
Downloads
Download entire package – 174 Kb
Download WinSpy – 20 Kb (demo application)